Astana (AsiaNews) - The visit made to Kazakhstan in recent days by Vladimir Putin (or by one of his impersonators, according to many comments circulating online) was his second trip abroad after the arrest order of war crimes tribunal in The Hague, which Astana does not observe because it does not adhere to the Rome Statute.
Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia, with several northern territories with a Russian-speaking majority, so the Astana meeting was an opportunity to evaluate the possible developments of Moscow's influence on this part of the territories historically under its check.
The Kazakh political scientist Dimaš Alžanov, interviewed by Azattyk, tried to draw a synthesis from this comparison, starting from Putin's parallel interviews with the newspaper Kazastanskaja Pravda, in which, quoting the Kazakh poet Abaj Kunanbaev, he recalled that "to achieve good it is necessary to know the Russian language and culture", and that of the Kazakh president Kasym-Žomart Tokaev to Russian Izvestia, in which he underlined the importance of "making Kazakh culture known to the world, in dialogue with the original culture of Russia".
At the end of the meeting no concluded agreement was communicated, but only a memorandum between the governments of the two countries "On mutual understanding between the energy ministries of Russia and Kazakhstan, in collaboration for the construction projects of the Kokšetau power plants, Semej and Ust-Kamenogorsk”.
One wonders what the real reason for Putin's visit was beyond the energy plants, and Alžanov invites us to "consider it from a broader spectrum, in the context of relations between the two regimes". The topics on the table were those announced in the interviews, and Tokaev "had to support Putin's narrative, the development of reciprocity in intercultural dialogue."
The Russian war in Ukraine has led Kazakhstan to various considerations about the Soviet past and the search for national identity. The geography of the spread of the Russian language in the world is narrowing, and "for Putin's propaganda it is essential to keep Kazakhstan within the sphere of Russian influence", says the political scientist.
Putin has his strategic interests at heart, and tries to defend them on the territory of Kazakhstan; in perspective, the citizens of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and other countries where Russian is still known well and studied in Russian schools will be able to become reservoirs of indispensable workforce for Russia in a strong demographic crisis.
Tokaev appears rather dominated by these strategies, failing to impose a clear line that defends the interests of Kazakhstan, often remaining rather lost and incapable of finding original and effective solutions.
First of all, recalls Alžanov, "there is the problem of diversification of trade routes and access to international markets". So far, Kazakhstan still remains too dependent on Russia in this sector, and Moscow's international isolation also greatly affects the Kazakh economy, which does not have very abundant resources and must pragmatically choose which way to turn.
The question of language therefore appears to be exquisitely political, to reaffirm the vitality of the "Russian world", and it is no coincidence that the context of Putin's visit, even in the declarations of the other ministers and representatives of Russia, particularly insists on education and training institutes, to send as many students as possible to Russia and spread the study of the language in Kazakhstan.
In fact, Moscow was expected to concentrate on Astana, as a follow-up to the operation in Ukraine, and the signs lead to a new "invasion" that is not warlike and destructive, but certainly not entirely peaceful: Kazakhstan appears as a more accessible destination, for regain control of the entire Central Asia.
