随着夏宝龙被任命，北京选择在香港采强硬路线
夏与习两人在浙江省一起工作的日子，夏是习近平的忠实拥护者。 他压制地下基督徒从而名声大噪，他的镇压手腕成为维吾尔族拘留营的榜样。 对于分析人士而言，夏将使用在西藏和新疆已经采用的方法，用在香港以实施非常压制的政策。
香港（亚洲新闻）– 为了重整香港的秩序，在民主运动领导的抗议活动持续数月之后，中国国家主席习近平选择了任命强硬派的他忠实拥护者夏宝龙（Xia Baolong）来监察香港高度自治城市的政治事务。 夏以镇压浙江省的基督徒而闻名，借鉴他在西藏和新疆所采取的强硬手段，以便对待香港事务。 以下是对新闻工作者和政治学家林和立（Willy Lam）的分析。 文章由詹姆斯敦基金会提供:
Introduction
Beijing has signaled a much tougher policy toward the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) with the announcement on February 13 that Xia Baolong (夏宝龙), the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), would take up a concurrent appointment as Director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). In the official pecking order of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a CPPCC vice-chairman is reckoned as a “state leader”—and therefore, this move portends the raising of the status of the HKMAO and the overall importance of Hong Kong affairs in national policy. Also significant is the fact that from 2002 to 2007, when Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping was party secretary of the coastal Zhejiang Province, Xia was deputy party secretary. The fact that Xia, who began his career in the Tianjian municipality, is an important Xi protégé is well-known among China analysts (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], February 14; HK01.com, February 13).
The HKMAO is usually headed by a ministerial-level official. Zhang Xiaoming (张晓明), a veteran of the HKMAO whom Xia replaced, is a ministerial-level cadre. After being demoted, Zhang remains the Executive Vice-Director of the HKMAO with the title of minister. However, it seems clear that his job will be to execute policies as directed by Xia—and above Xia, Xi Jinping. With the appointment of a key associate as head of the HKMAO, Xi also indirectly takes over the position of the highest arbiter of Hong Kong and Macau affairs. This is despite the fact that according to division of labor, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member in charge of Hong Kong—the Head of the Central Coordination Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs (CCGHKMA)—is PBSC member and Vice-Premier Han Zheng (韩正). In the past few years, Han has focused on infrastructure programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Greater Bay Area Project, leaving Hong Kong-related political issues to Xi as the “lifelong core” of the party (BBC Chinese Service, February 13; ITN.com [Taipei], December 3, 2019; PRC State Council, March 1, 2019).
Xia Baolong’s Tenure in Zhejiang Province—and What It Portends for the Future
Given the long Chinese tradition of the rule of men, instead of the rule of law, it is important to understand the traits and policy orientation of Xia (born 1952). After steadily rising through the ranks in Tianjin from 1970 to 2003, Xia was appointed CCP Deputy Secretary of Zhejiang from 2003 to 2007. During this time, he doubled as a member of the Zhejiang Standing Committee for Political-Legal Affairs. It was his orthodox stance on CCP social control, and his intolerance of dissident voices and the growth of civil society, which endeared Xia to Xi. Xia was made Governor of Zhejiang in 2012, and Party Secretary one year later.
In his first months upon arrival in Zhejiang, Xia visited various Zhejiang cities such as prosperous Wenzhou, which has a sizeable Christian community. Xia reportedly told his subordinates that he wondered whether the church or the CCP was running the show in swathes of Zhejiang. Then in 2014, Xia opened the first salvo in a nationwide crackdown on underground Protestant and Catholic churches by forcibly destroying the crosses on church buildings—and sometimes the whole churches themselves—in different Zhejiang cities. Xia’s goal is to “Sinicize” Christianity, or to inject Confucian and other Chinese values into the Western creed, through the arbitrary change of Church dogma (RTHK.hk, February 13; Christianitytoday.com, March 20, 2019; Chinaaid.net, October 16, 2017; Zhejiang News, June 26, 2015).
While Xia seemed to enjoy Xi’s full support, Xi also seemed—if only for a brief period—to realize the international image problems produced by this harshest prosecution of religion in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution. At a Central Meeting on National Religious Affairs held in Beijing in 2016, provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu and Hebei were cited for their effective religious work; Zhejiang, however, was strangely missing. Despite speculation that Xia would gain a Politburo-level slot at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, he was instead given the prestigious pre-retirement job at the CPPCC. At the same time, Li Qiang (李强), Governor of Zhejiang and another Xi protégé, was promoted Party Secretary of Shanghai; he also won a seat on the ruling Politburo (Huanqiu Shibao, May 5, 2017; Xinhua, April 23, 2016).
According to Ying Fuk-tsang, Dean of the Divinity School of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Xi Jinping might have thought for several months that Xia had gone overboard in suppression of the Christian church—but Xia never lost Xi’s trust. In 2018, the destruction of churches and crosses resumed in Henan Province and other jurisdictions. “Xi has a high estimation of the fact that Xia takes the party’s interests first and that he is a ruthless enforcer,” Ying said. “That is why Xia has been brought back to the frontline now that cracking down on ‘anti-China’ forces has become top priority in Beijing’s policy toward the SAR.”[1]
Changes in Beijing’s Policy Apparatus for Hong Kong
Xia’s appointment is not an isolated event: the entire structure of Beijing’s Hong Kong policy establishment has been changed. Luo Huining (骆惠宁), the newly appointed Director of the Hong Kong-based Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong SAR (HKCLO)—which serves as Beijing’s mission in the SAR––was made concurrently a Vice-Director of the HKMAO. (Fu Ziying, director of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Macao Special Administrative Region, was also concurrently appointed as a deputy director of the HKMAO.) Prior to this development, the ministerial-level posts of the heads of the HKMAO and the HKCLO were held by different cadres and they did not report to each other. Now Luo, a former party secretary of Qinghai and Shanxi (who, like Xia himself, was given a pre-retirement job at the National People’s Congress just late last year), has to report to Xia—and through Xia, to supreme leader Xi (DWnews.com, February 15; Caixin.com, February 13).
Luo is not known as a member of the Xi Jinping faction, but he is considered acceptable to Xi as a compromise candidate for the Hong Kong post. Luo served in top positions in the Qinghai Autonomous Region from 2003 to 2016, prior to his appointment as party boss of the larger province of Shanxi. Given that the remote northwestern region of Qinghai has a sizeable minority of Tibetans, Luo, like Xia, has ample experience implementing harsh policies in regions with restive populations. Luo is also much more senior in experience than his predecessor Wang Zhimin; and Wang, like Zhang Xiaoming, served a significant portion of his career in the Hong Kong and Macau policy establishments (BBC Chinese Service, January 6; South China Morning Post, January 4).
Conclusion: What Xia’s Appointment Means for Hong Kong
What will the new appointment of Xia portend for Beijing’s Hong Kong policy? Most politicians and commentators from the pro-democracy camp are worried that Xia will enforce tighter control—and further press the “one country two systems” framework—through streamlining of the Hong Kong policy establishment and appointing top protégés to head Hong Kong affairs. Wu Chi-Wai, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, has told local media that cadres such as Xia and Luo are “hardliners” faithful to Xi. “They will implement a policy that stresses that priority will be given to the national interest,” he said. “They will tightly implement Beijing’s control over Hong Kong policy” (Singtao Daily [Hong Kong], February 14).
Foremost on Xia’s agenda could be the promulgation of some form of national security legislation, such as the much-feared draft “Article 23” legislation—which would punish SAR residents found guilty of sedition, secession, leaking of state secrets, and other anti-Beijing activities (China Brief, November 19, 2019). The Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party in late 2019 emphasized that Hong Kong must “build up an effective legal system and execution mechanism for the SAR to safeguard national security” (建立健全特區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制, jianli jianquan tequ weihu guojia anquan de falu zhidu he zhixing jizhi). This point has been emphasized by senior cadres including Zhang Xiaoming and Luo Huining. Upon assuming office as Director of the HKCLO, Luo repeated this point verbatim, saying that without concrete measures to ensure the nation’s security and stability, both Hong Kong and the motherland risked being “infiltrated and damaged” by hostile foreign forces (News.now.com [Hong Kong], January 20; Radio France International, November 1, 2019).
Over the longer term, the CCP will likely work behind the scenes to see that more force is used to tackle the demonstrations that grew out of the anti-Extradition Bill movement in mid-2019 (China Brief, June 26, 2019). Beijing will also take steps to further promote “patriotic education,” and textbooks will be gradually changed to emphasize the glorious achievements of the PRC—as well as the duty of every SAR citizen to be loyal to the state, and to foil “plots” that threaten national security (China Brief, December 10, 2019). The CCP will also try to stifle the SAR’s civil society, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—particularly religious-oriented NGOs, and those originating from the U.S. and other Western countries—could be put under more scrutiny. Notably, Article 23 forbids Hong Kong’s political organizations from making some forms of association with counterparts in foreign countries (Christian Times [Hong Kong], February 14; Apple Daily [Hong Kong], January 2; Ming Pao, November 14, 2019).
Since Xia reports directly to Xi, the means and mechanisms that Beijing will adopt to materialize “comprehensive rule” in the Hong Kong SAR could become swifter and more efficacious than before. It is conceivable that in the long run, at least a modicum of the mentality behind Beijing’s treatment of Uighurs and Tibetans might be applied to the citizens of Hong Kong. After all, it was Xia’s suppression of underground Christians beginning in 2014 that set the tone for the internment camps in Xinjiang, whose goal is the “Sinicization” of the Uighur minorities. Xia’s comeback to power in a position of prominence is emblematic of Xi’s desire to tighten Beijing’s grip over politics, economics, and civil society in the Hong Kong SAR.
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[1] Author’s interview with Professor Ying Fuk-tsang, February 2020.
