The Russian World

The Decembrist revolt on December 14, 1825 saw army officers and intellectuals in favor of liberal reforms attempt to seize power after the sudden death of Tsar Alexander I, only to be crushed by the repression of Nicholas I. An icon of the recurring alternation between “system” and “revolt,” regime and anarchy, in the parable of Russian history.

2025 does not mark the end of wars, but the division between the dictatorships of East and West. The new Russian language dictionary relaunches visions of democracy and autocracy in official ideology. The speciality of Witkoff and Dmitriev, architects of the truce “project”, is counting money and dividing the spoils. The clash over language and the issue of coexistence between Orthodox Churches.

Scandals in Kyiv are increasingly intertwined with frequent discussions about Zelensky's departure from power. Justice, transparency, “purity”, and the punishment of the guilty appear to be the priorities under the mounting rubble of war.

Believing in Russia does not automatically mean believing in God and religious dogmas, belonging to the Orthodox Church does not necessarily mean attending liturgical celebrations, and supporting “traditional values” does not automatically translate into accepting the dictates of the catechism.

In a divided and conflict-ridden world, universal unity is Moscow's new religion. It relies on destabilisation, propaganda, and the financing of "friendly" elites and oligarchs loyal to Moscow, along with the Churches as tools of power. After Ukraine, Kazakhstan is the country most at risk, with the longest land border and the largest Russian diaspora. The US, the EU, and international partners will have to strengthen economic and diplomatic relations with the territories targeted by Moscow.

In his new book, writer Mikhail Zygar retraces the last thirty years of the Soviet Union through a gallery of characters, helping us to understand Moscow's present based on the idea that no dictatorship is eternal and that the future always offers a chance for change.

The 2025 military campaign, the most violent and systematic, is nearing its conclusion before the winter freeze. For one expert, “the strategic context of the war is [. . .] shifting," while Russia’s economy slides towards stagnation. Trump is tempted to conclude a "mutual deal" with Putin. Neither Russia nor Ukraine are truly capable of changing the course and nature of the war.

The creation of a platform at the Council of Europe for dialogue with the democratic forces in Russia that oppose Vladimir Putin's regime is hampered by internal divisions between the various groups, including criticism of the Anti-Corruption Fund created by Alexei Navalny. Vladimir Kara-Murza's appeal: ‘Every political prisoner must be able to count on not being forgotten’.

Unlike the Gaza deal, the summer drama surrounding the meeting between Putin and Trump in Alaska did not lead to a letup in military operations, but rather pushed both sides towards further escalation, in deeds and words. As in 1914, the "illusion of fate" is dangerously rising again, obliterating all possibilities for choice and diplomatic solutions.

By 31 December, another 135,000 young Russians will be called up for military service under increasingly stringent conditions to prevent loopholes. The aim is not primarily to expand the army, but to redefine the very fabric of society, making the entire population feel at the front, even if it is mainly Caucasians and Asians who are sent to be slaughtered.

Moldova, which is seemingly the closest target for Moscow's "hybrid war”, is headed to parliamentary elections tomorrow. Meanwhile, unidentified aircraft circling in the skies of Europe are like menacing totems, evoking the Siberian-rooted shamanism that, in today’s Russia, is one of the most radical expressions of its “defence of traditional values” against Western depravity.

There is an essential and original link between the Orthodox faith and power, as already shown in the 11th century by Metropolitan Hilarion's “Discourse on Law and Grace”, the “manifesto” of the Russian faith. Apart from Philip II of Moscow, who rebelled against the massacres of the first Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible at the end of the 16th century and was suffocated in his monastic cell as a result, there are no known cases of other ecclesiastical opponents of the monarchs' holy wars.