Pyongyang (AsiaNews) – Kim Jong-un has turned a corruption case in the military into a show of force aimed at North Korea’s entire ruling class, similar to what is already happening in China and what has happened in recent years in Vietnam.
General Pak Hui-chol’s dismissal and trial represent one of the most significant purges in recent years. The general, who until recently was deputy director for organisational affairs in the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, has been accused of building a system of bribery and favouritism within the military hierarchy.
Last week, Kim convened a rare meeting of top leaders from the Workers' Party, government, and the Central Military Commission solely to discuss corruption within the military. This is the first meeting of this kind to be made public.
The General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army is responsible for overseeing the military's ideological loyalty and ensuring that the armed forces remain subordinate to the Workers' Party.
According to the indictment, Pak ran a system selling military promotions for at least four years, taking bribes, diverting public funds, and assigning top positions to officers loyal to him.
Kim Jong-un called him the "ringleader of corruption," while the party-controlled media described crimes of huge proportions.
A possible sentence has not yet been announced, but the tone used in the reporting suggests that the general could face a very severe sentence, including detention in a labour camp or even the death penalty.
A purge to strengthen Kim's power
According to observers, however, the decision to go public with the case represents the most significant development.
In North Korea, purges are usually handled with the utmost secrecy; this time, however, the regime has decided to expose one of its most influential leaders.
Several analysts believe that Kim decided to send a clear message to the top brass of the regime: no leader, civilian or military, can build their own power network without exposing themselves to the risk of elimination.
The most well-known precedent is that of Jang Song-Thaek, the North Korean leader's uncle, arrested and executed in 2013 (two years after Kim Jong-un came to power) after being considered the second most powerful man in the country.
Back then, the charges were political treason, while today the regime is citing corruption, but the logic appears to be the same: using trials to reaffirm the leader's personal authority.
From the Jang Song-Thaek case to Shimhwajo
Other commentators have compared the affair to one of the great purge campaigns in North Korean history, that of Shimhwajo, the secret network created in the late 1990s by Kim Jong-il (father of the current leader) to identify and eliminate suspected hostile elements within the Party.
The operation, launched during the years of the devastating famine that struck the country, led to thousands of arrests, imprisonments, and executions, and helped consolidate the leader's power, placing the blame for the economic disaster on individual officials.
Why the army has become so influential
The North Korean military has undergone profound changes over the years. In addition to its traditional military duties, the armed forces have become increasingly directly involved in managing the country’s economy, building residential neighbourhoods, developing infrastructures, operating mines, and participating in numerous industrial projects promoted by the regime.
The expansion of these responsibilities has increased the volume of economic resources controlled by military leaders, creating new opportunities for personal enrichment.
Pak’s trial may suggest that practices such as buying and selling military promotions or the use of public funds have become widespread even at the highest levels of the regime.
Some analysts also believe that the purges may be linked to the gradual resumption of trade with China after the pandemic years, during which the borders were sealed.
Eliminating patronage networks and corrupt officials would allow the regime to clean up the systems that run contracts and economic resources before new capital begins to flow again.
The message to North Koreans and regime officials
At the same time, the anti-corruption campaign also speaks to the population. In a country cyclically affected by food shortages and where essential consumer goods continue to be in short supply, blaming individual corrupt officials offers a target for popular discontent, while preventing criticism from being directed at the entire system.
The investigation may not be limited to Pak Hui-Chol. Jo Yong-Won, one of Kim Jong-un's most trusted aides, could be leading the crackdown after he recently returned to head the Party’s Organisation and Guidance Department, which oversees appointments and promotions within the regime.
More than a simple anti-corruption drive, Kim's campaign therefore appears to be a new show of force, designed to maintain firm control over the Party, the military, and the entire state apparatus.
