Milan (AsiaNews) – 30 September 2026 is a date being watched closely in Baghdad. It marks the formal conclusion of the US-led international coalition’s military mission against ISIS and the completion of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. The following day, at least according to the Baghdad government, the country should finally be free of foreign military presence.
It marks the end of a period that began in 2003 with the US invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein. A period that appeared to have ended in 2011, when the last US troops left Iraq, but which resumed three years later with the advance of ISIS and the capture of Mosul and vast swathes of the country. Today, the so-called Islamic State no longer controls any territory, and the fight against jihadism rests primarily with Iraqi forces.
Weapons under state control
But 30 September comes at a time that is anything but peaceful. For whilst the Americans are preparing for military withdrawal, the government in Baghdad is attempting to do what none of its predecessors has truly managed to achieve: bringing all weapons in the country back under state authority.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had set out precisely this path: armed groups operating outside the state’s chain of command should be integrated into official structures, with a reorganisation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which were formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and have since become a permanent component of the Iraqi security apparatus.
The deadline, however, risks remaining merely on paper. Some militant groups have accepted the path set out by Baghdad. Others, particularly those closest to Iran – from Kata’ib Hezbollah to Harakat al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada – have stalled or rejected disarmament. For them, the issue is not merely an Iraqi one. As long as the confrontation between the US, Israel and Tehran continues, they argue, their armed presence remains a means of defending national sovereignty.
This is precisely where the Iraqi paradox lies. The US withdrawal is supposed to strengthen Baghdad’s sovereignty, but conversely, it could also make it more difficult for the government to assert its authority over the militias. Until now, the presence of US forces has in many cases served as a deterrent. But what about now? The problem, therefore, is not merely how many US troops will remain after 30 September – if any do remain. It is a question of understanding what balance of power will emerge following their withdrawal.
New regional order
A recent analysis by the Carnegie Middle East Centre suggests viewing current events within the broader context of a transformation of the regional order. Israel’s wars in Gaza and against Iran, the US’s difficulties in guaranteeing stable security for its allies, and the search for new agreements by regional powers are calling into question what has for decades been the role of the United States in the Middle East. It is no coincidence that, over the past two years, Baghdad has signed security agreements with Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, building a network of cooperation spanning everything from training to border security, and from intelligence to counter-terrorism. The problem is that none of these agreements comes close to what the American presence used to guarantee, particularly in the fields of air defence, technological capabilities and intelligence. In short, it is the slow but steady erosion of the so-called Pax Americana.
This phenomenon is also evident beyond Iraq. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has been weakened but remains a decisive political and military player. In Yemen, the Houthis continue to control a significant part of the country and pose a threat to Red Sea shipping lanes and Gulf security. Syria is still characterised by fragile internal balances and foreign interests. And Iran, despite having suffered heavy blows, continues to regard its network of regional allies as a key component of its own security.
The Centrality of Iraq
In this context, Iraq is now more central than ever, because it lies precisely at the point where the various fault lines converge: Iran and the United States, the Arab world and regional powers, the central government and militias, national sovereignty and external influence.
The question, then, is whether Baghdad will succeed in using the American withdrawal to consolidate the state, or whether the military vacuum will be filled by others. For in the Middle East, a vacuum rarely remains as such for long.
One final point must be borne in mind. On 3 November, the United States will hold mid-term elections to renew the House of Representatives and part of the Senate. The withdrawal from Iraq cannot automatically be attributed to electoral considerations, but US domestic politics inevitably influences foreign policy decisions, especially following the opening of a new front with Iran. Donald Trump’s promise to reduce the ‘endless wars’ is now, more than ever, being tested by a region that continues to demand a US presence, deterrence and protection.
30 September, therefore, certainly does not mark the end of the American presence in the Middle East. Rather, it will mark the end of a particular approach. US forces are leaving Iraq after more than twenty years of wars and interventions, but Washington intends to keep the situation under control, primarily through economic leverage: energy, trade, investment and infrastructure. Will this be enough to prevent the country from being once again engulfed by regional sectarianism and plunging back into a spiral of violence?
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