The Arctic is increasingly at the centre of international attention. The ice, which for decades hindered navigation and limited access to resources, is rapidly receding due to climate change.
At the same time, the region's political map is also shifting: new routes and mining opportunities are transforming the Arctic into an area of growing strategic rivalry.
Since 2024, military cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic has become more evident: Russian and Chinese strategic bombers conducted joint patrols off the coast of Alaska for the first time, and the Chinese Coast Guard entered the Arctic for the first time as part of a joint patrol with Russia.
Against this backdrop, Donald Trump spoke again in January 2026 about gaining control of Greenland, directly linking the issue to Russia and China, “Because if we don't do it, Russia or China will take over Greenland,” he said.
On 22 September in New York, the United States signed an agreement with Denmark securing a "permanent role" in the region's security through the renewal of the Pituffik base and a ban on establishing bases for non-NATO nations.
The Atlantic Alliance had already begun strengthening its Arctic presence in February. Secretary General Mark Rutte attributed this move to intensifying Russian military activity and China's interest in the region.
For decades, Russia maintained that key decisions regarding the Arctic should rest with the regional states, focusing primarily on cooperation within the Arctic Council.
China, for its part, has sought to gain a foothold in the North, including through participation in major economic projects.
For Beijing, however, its Arctic presence holds significance beyond mere economic reasons; Ksenia Vakhrusheva of the Arctic Project at the environmental organisation Bellona attributes this interest to China's desire to shape a new balance of power in the region.
Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic began to develop in the early 2010s around the Yamal LNG project. This major initiative for the extraction and export of liquefied natural gas on the Yamal Peninsula subsequently became a key platform for cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in the region.
Initially, Moscow was quite reluctant to allow China to operate in the area. Chinese scientists were denied permission to conduct research, and the Russian side did not support the involvement of Chinese shipyards in the construction of icebreakers.
However, following the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia over the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, Moscow was compelled to more actively seek a partnership with China. Consequently, in 2015, Russia sold an additional stake in the Yamal project to China.
This, in turn, opened up new opportunities for Beijing to pursue its Arctic ambitions, as noted by Arild Moe, a Norwegian political scientist and professor at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
In 2018, China declared itself a Near-Arctic State and outlined its policy for the region; the government began speaking of a Polar Silk Road, which became part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Beijing's activity in the Arctic has reached record levels, particularly in trade, energy cooperation, and the use of the Northern Sea Route.
According to the analytics firm Strider Intel, the number of Chinese companies in the Russian Arctic region grew from 10 in 2015 to 359 by mid-2023.
Cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic is not merely economic; in recent years, the region's strategic importance has become increasingly significant.
Currently, there are over 50 military bases and other facilities in the Arctic operated by Russia and NATO countries, with approximately half of them under Russian control.
Much of Russia's infrastructure dates back to the Soviet era, but since 2014, Moscow has actively engaged in its restoration and modernisation, while simultaneously building new bases and airfields. At the same time, military activity by NATO countries in the region is also on the rise.
The accession of Finland and Sweden to the Atlantic Alliance, in 2023 and 2024, respectively, has effectively split the Arctic region into two roughly equal parts: one dominated by Russia, the other by NATO countries.
Against this backdrop, Moscow and Beijing have begun to more actively demonstrate military cooperation, this according to Ilia Shumanov, co-founder of the non-profit organisation Arctida, which conducts specialised analysis and research on the Russian Arctic.
“It is too early to speak of full military cooperation between the two countries, but this is an important symbolic signal to the West, indicating China's willingness to collaborate with Russia.”
For Arctida CEO Nail Farkhatdinov, “China's interest in the Arctic is best described as reconnaissance;” in short; “it suggests experimentation and observation rather than a structured policy of large-scale expansion or the organisation of major expeditions.”
One of the clearest examples of China's exploratory interests in the Russian Arctic is the Northern Sea Route, which runs along Russia's northern and eastern borders and significantly shortens the journey between Asia and Europe, by approximately 8,000 kilometres.
Precisely for this reason, it is attracting increasing attention: compared to the route via the Suez Canal, the Northern Sea Route could make shipping much shorter and faster.
For a long time, it remained virtually inaccessible due to a thick blanket of multi-year ice, but interest in this route is growing as the ice melts.
Since the mid-2000s, the ice has begun to retreat during the summer months, extending the navigation season and opening up new opportunities for Arctic shipping.
In recent years, the navigation season has lengthened to 4–5 months, and it is projected that by 2030–2040, the route could be navigable for up to six months.
Although Russian officials and state media continue to project an image of equal cooperation with China, in practice, according to Shumanov, Russia finds itself in a vulnerable position regarding influence and control over the route.
"The seller depends on the buyer," and further price reductions represent a loss for Russian taxpayers, as the Russian economy will benefit less.
At the same time, China is developing its own operational capabilities in polar waters; it possesses at least five polar research icebreakers and regularly deploys them in the Arctic.
Beijing is also developing technologies to build more powerful vessels: in 2025, a Chinese shipyard unveiled the design for a multifunctional nuclear-powered icebreaker, approximately 165 metres long with a displacement of nearly 30,000 tonnes.
The example of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline is also highly significant. Despite years of negotiations and a memorandum of understanding signed in 2025, China is in no rush to fully implement the project. The parties are still negotiating gas prices, supply terms, and the allocation of construction costs.
Beijing included project preparation in its 2026–2030 development plan, yet no definitive deal regarding construction or start dates has been reached.
For Russian authorities, demonstrating that Russia is not alone in the Arctic is important; any expression of interest from China, such as participation in the Eastern Economic Forum or a Chinese delegation's visit to Murmansk for Arctic discussions, benefits Moscow.
Conversely, Indigenous peoples fear the additional risks that Russian-Chinese cooperation might entail. Human rights activist Pavel Sulyandziga points out that Chinese companies generally fail to meet international standards regarding the protection of human rights and indigenous peoples.
Environmentalists and representatives of Indigenous communities worry that expanding resource extraction in the Arctic could increase pressure on fragile tundra ecosystems, water sources, and areas used for traditional land-based activities.
For Indigenous peoples, such changes threaten traditional practices such as reindeer herding, fishing, and hunting.
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