International political analyst Alexey Naumov analysed the current situation in the South Caucasus, and the challenges it poses for Russian regional policy, in an interview with Vestnik Kavkaza. For him, it is essential to focus efforts on the security and economic prosperity of all countries in the region.
The South Caucasus is undergoing a profound, sweeping transformation driven by the resolution of the medium-term consequences of the Karabakh war and the impact of large-scale military conflicts in neighbouring regions on the global order.
Azerbaijan and Armenia are close to signing a peace treaty and are establishing trade relations, while Georgia finds itself in a "cold war" situation with the European Union due to its reluctance to impose sanctions on Russia.
New relations
With the Strait of Hormuz blocked, the demand for overland freight transport routes between East and West jumped drastically.
The foreign policies of the South Caucasus states have shifted in line with new regional and extra-regional realities; consequently, for the region's largest state, the Russian Federation, the task of modernising its approach to the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly urgent.
Russia’s national interests remain unchanged: comprehensive, mutually beneficial cooperation with its historic partners and strategic allies, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the expansion of ties with Georgia, to the extent that the Georgian authorities are willing to welcome them.
However, these interests are now being pursued under significantly altered circumstances, a crucial factor to consider when developing and maintaining ties with the South Caucasus states.
In fact, a new balance of power is emerging in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan has restored its territorial integrity; Armenia, under its new leadership, is pursuing a policy of recognising and accepting regional political realities; and recent parliamentary elections have demonstrated that the authorities enjoy a certain level of trust among the Armenian electorate.
A similar process is underway in Georgia where there is growing awareness that the logic of conflict is unfeasible and hopeless, leading only to a deterioration in the population's living conditions.
Generally, Armenia realises it cannot afford a conflict with Azerbaijan, and Georgia realises it cannot afford a conflict with Russia.
All three countries in the South Caucasus are currently undergoing restructuring, and it is important to emphasise that, as Naumov notes, a “new balance of power is still taking shape”.
For instance, a crucial debate is underway regarding the terms of the so-called TRIPP[*] Corridor, which the Azerbaijanis call the "Zangezur Corridor".
Armenia wants it to operate in accordance with Armenian law, insisting that all infrastructure crossing Armenia from the Azerbaijani region of Zangilan to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, including railway, highway, gas pipeline, and power line, be subject to Armenian law.
Baku and Ankara clearly prefer different terms for the TRIPP corridor, and negotiations on this issue are ongoing. By now, it has become fundamentally clear that each country in the South Caucasus is gaining a more comprehensive understanding of their own sovereignty.
There is a growing need to shed past dependencies on external power centres, and multidimensional foreign policies are being developed in all the capitals: Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi.
In other words, the expert notes, "the formation of a new South Caucasus, its self-determination, is unfolding before our eyes. [. . .] It is a constantly evolving picture, but the situation is undeniable: sovereignty is gaining momentum in each of the republics.”
Two-way relations
With the end of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict five years ago, the bond linking Russia to Armenia as a directly involved party was severed.
The Karabakh war was a thorn in the side that hindered the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations; now that the Karabakh issue has been finally and irrevocably resolved, Moscow could elevate cooperation with Baku to a level that was unattainable during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
At the same time, Russian-Azerbaijani relations also have their complexities; it is clear that in both countries some circles have no interest in strengthening ties between Moscow and Baku, circles that regularly exploit various conflicting reports and events to obstruct, hinder, and slow down the development of cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan.
Still, at the highest political levels, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev have issued a very specific directive, repeatedly voiced in public, to develop ties between the two states.
The crisis triggered by the AZAL plane crash on 25 December 2024 complicated relations, but Moscow has made significant efforts to resolve it, acknowledging responsibility for the incident as well as obligations regarding the tragedy's aftermath, thus settling every aspect of the case.
Moscow has demonstrated that it is a strong actor, neither shirking responsibility nor refusing to solve the situation, and now expects the South Caucasus nations to act accordingly and take responsibility for their own actions.
Russia’s relations with each of the South Caucasus countries are a two-way street; every capital – Moscow, Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi – must commit to building and improving these ties.
Russia will not quit the Caucasus, for as the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasises in its statements, "Russia, too, is a Caucasus state."
As the contours of the new South Caucasus begin to take shape, Russia’s own role is undergoing a process of redefinition and reshaping, whose ultimate outcome is crucial for both Russian interests in the region and those of the regional states themselves.
Russia is prepared to acknowledge the independence and agency of post-Soviet countries and to respect their choices and political paths, provided, of course, these do not pose a threat to the Russian Federation.
“The experience of recent decades demonstrates that regarding Russia as an enemy is entirely inappropriate in the context of national foreign policy,” Naumov notes; since Russia’s security interests are paramount for Moscow, forging an alliance with Russia is both reasonable and advantageous.
It is important that Russia is willing to listen to and understand its partners in the South Caucasus and is prepared to take their interests into account. To this end, it must consistently engage in dialogue without compromising its own security interests.
Russia is involved in a long and difficult conflict with the West and needs to establish non-Western trade and logistics chains; this is why the International North-South Transport Corridor, whose construction is being accelerated since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, is so important.
The South Caucasus is significant for Russia not only in terms of bilateral cooperation with its countries but also as a transit region.
An example of cooperation?
In the modern world, security considerations now take precedence over economic advantages; if Russia’s security interests in the South Caucasus are safeguarded and respected, all parties involved will benefit.
In such a scenario, Russia can invest in ongoing projects and prepare for new forms of political and economic cooperation.
For instance, if the TRIPP project entails only economic integration, without active political involvement by the United States in the South Caucasus, it could well succeed.
Therefore, Armenia must demonstrate to Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia that its cooperation with the European Union and the United States poses no threat to the countries of the South Caucasus region, to the local balance of power, and to stability.
As a global logistics hub, the South Caucasus could serve as a prime example of economic cooperation among a wide range of global powers; however, in today's reality, marked by the emergence of a "with us or against us" mindset, this unfortunately appears utopian.
China currently offers a good example of an extra-regional state’s activity in the South Caucasus that does not threaten Russia’s security interests.
Chinese assistance in constructing the Anaklia deep-water port can be viewed by Russia as entirely unproblematic, since China has no intention of using the project to manipulate Georgian politicians.
The West, by contrast, often operates in complex ways, and the entire region faces the risk that excessive Western integration could create new security threats.
Russia can certainly cooperate with non-regional states in the South Caucasus, but it considers itself to have a right of precedence, rooted in ancient and modern, Tsarist and Soviet history, that casts its shadow over the current war against globalisation, which demands new forms of global communication.
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[*] Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity
