The Illiberal World of Russia and China
Russian political scientist and ultra-Putinist Gleb Kuznetsov published an article in the magazine Gosudarstvo (The State) where he explicitly states that “the separation of powers, competitive elections, and freedom of speech prevent the state from functioning effectively.” He points to the example of Shenzhen, “one of the most controlled cities in the world” as a model.
When the Soviet empire ended, 35 years ago, everyone was convinced that the communist ideology, which subordinates liberal principles to those of collective totalitarianism, had been shelved.
Some leftovers remained from the 20th-century “Red World”, such as Cuba, Vietnam, and, of course, China, Mao Zedong’s huge legacy, which was thought to be undergoing a capitalist and liberal "conversion”, only to discover that Beijing's capitalism had become one of the dominant factors in the world economy, without Chinese citizens being granted personal rights and freedoms.
The crisis of globalism, understood as the breaking down of borders and universal freedom of trade and interaction between the peoples of the entire world, began two decades after the "end of history”, with the financial crashes of 2008 and the subsequent shocks that reshaped the geopolitical balance.
While China sought to take advantage of the breakdown of Western power, inserting itself into the gaping holes of the global economy with new “silk roads”, Russia saw the opportunity to recover from the humiliation of playing a marginal role, and regain control of its empire not with money, but with weapons and the apocalyptic threats of its arsenals and ideological aspirations, inherited from centuries ago, more than ever appropriate for the “new Middle Ages” the world is facing as it tries to understand what future it must prepare for.
Russia now takes credit for destroying the West's globalist domination and establishing the new “multipolar” world order, something obsessively repeated by President Vladimir Putin and all his minions, even if it remains to be seen how many "poles" have actually been created, in the global opposition between the North/West and the South/East, with the corridors in the Far Northern Arctic, the "middle" ones in Asia and the Caucasus, and the southern ones where the "pirate" ships of Russia's shadow fleet roam, now stopped by sovereign America, which is splitting from Europe, in an increasingly dizzy multipolar carousel.
Beyond the unpredictable twists and turns of geopolitics, which provide commentators around the world with grounds for unbridled fantasies, a systematic factor now seems to be prevailing across the board: the end of liberal values, replaced by the "traditional values" on which the entire world was based before the modern “degradation” of democracy.
The pro-Putin Russian political scientist Gleb Kuznetsov published an article along these lines in the journal Gosudarstvo (Государство, The State), where he explicitly states that “the separation of powers, competitive elections, and freedom of speech prevent the state from functioning effectively”, an idea reiterated by ideologue Alexandr Dugin when he says that “the era of democratic nation states is over.”
Thus, in radical ways typical of Russia, a new global ideology of sovereignism and traditionalism is emerging, reviving contemporary forms of autocracy in which the leader directs the will of the people in an “illiberal” mode – the decisive term Putin has been repeating since his famous speech in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, after listening to the many homilies of Moscow Patriarch Kirill against liberalism, the evil that has been destroying the world since the French Revolution, or rather, since the rise of Latin scholastic theology.
Since then, Russia has begun to distance itself from Western powers, starting the war with Georgia in 2008, which has now been tamed according to the Kremlin's will, and since 2014 with Ukraine, torn apart by a seemingly endless symbolic conflict between different worldviews.
Kuznetsov argues that 21st-century people are increasingly despising social and political freedoms in exchange for “free digital services”, marking the beginning of a "technological Middle Ages" that replaces personal responsibility with the artificial domination of minds.
The Russian political scientist is not just expressing an isolated opinion, albeit one related to the official ideology, but rather summarising the work of one of the Kremlin's most important think tanks, the Eisi Group, led by one of Putin's key advisors and potential heirs, former Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko.
Kutzentsov’s article has been carefully analysed by one of Meduza's analysts, Andrey Pertsev, who sought to understand the secret to the success of the "illiberal systems" of Russia and China, which push the people of these countries to choose digital control over liberal values.
The magazine Gosudarstvo was launched in 2025, precisely with the aim of expressing the principles of the new ideology in increasingly effective ways, thanks to the contribution of "political technologists”, as the heralds of the dominant thinking are called in Russia.
For example, Alexander Kharichev, another of Kirienko's men, writes about the "sacredness of power" supported by the “capacity for sacrifice” and the “collectivism” of Russians, combining the principles of Tsarism and Soviet communism.
These aspects are underscored in an article by another member of the group, Boris Rapoport, titled “Issues and tasks of the domestic policy of the Russian state in different historical eras”, which states that “the sparse population on Russia's vast territory and the harsh climate have forced Russians to embrace the idea of a strong state as one of the fundamental principles for ensuring their survival.”
Political technologist Andrey Polosin proposes a text on “digital legitimacy”, which aligns with Kuznetsov's thesis on the now unstoppable prevalence of “illiberal regimes” over “liberal” ones, as evinced above all by the systems of Russia and China.
No specific "liberal regimes" are mentioned, generically referred to as “Western states” where “legitimacy is based on the procedures and illusions of social control over institutions”, while illiberals propose the alternative source of “technological effectiveness”.
Periodic elections every four to five years are, in fact, deceptive, because the ruling regime is supposed to work for voters every day, when in fact this service can only be achieved in a “visible and non-measurable” way through digital structures.
These technological services are so useful to citizens that they become “a decisive argument in favour of the system, much more so than abstract discussions on democratic procedures," adds Kuznetsov.
The advantage of illiberal states like Russia and China lies not in their control over the population as such, but in “converting this control into true legitimacy, thanks to the provision of quality services in the most convenient forms”, which make daily life simpler and more satisfying.
For this reason, “there is no need to manipulate public opinion”, and the success of the illiberal approach is ensured by the "concentration of power”, considered dangerous by decadent liberal regimes.
The examples cited are the two megacities of Moscow and Shenzhen, both with approximately 13 million inhabitants, where city services provide “the highest level of comfort” compared to any Western metropolis, where it is clear that “political decisions become technological responses”, and the mayor assumes the role of "general director of the city”, stripping himself of the explicit function of power and exalting that of “service”, whose boundary with “supervision” becomes entirely secondary and invisible.
This is why Muscovites, and increasingly Russians in general, willingly accept total control by central and local authorities, because "the more they control, the more comfortable one lives," and if control were to be removed, “it would not be a liberation, but a return to the risk of the unknown.”
China’s experience arouses ever-increasing enthusiasm among Russian political scientists, as demonstrated by the example of Shenzhen, which in 40 years has morphed from a rural village to a “technological capital” thanks to the total absence of the traits deemed indispensable by Westerners: elections, independent media, and the separation of powers.
“One of the most controlled cities in the world functions very effectively, in a way that Western cities can only dream of,” the specialist notes.
Kuznetsov stresses that one of the main advantages of illiberal systems is “independence from electoral cycles”. In countries under this kind of rule, elections are held only to celebrate the regime in power, which can pursue its programmes "for decades”, while systems based on liberal alternations prevent the fulfilment of the promises made to voters.
Since parliamentary elections will be held in Russia in a month and a half, these explanations will undoubtedly help Russian citizens choose their representatives, who will be the guardians of their illiberal well-being.
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