Beijing's business interests in the region – which have grown exponentially with the war in Ukraine – now exceed billion, twice that of Moscow. China supports trade with the conviction that improving living standards can avert any danger of conflict, as seen with the border agreements between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
The removal from a monument of the Russian word used to refer to the famine caused by Stalin in the 1930s with the forced abolition of small private farmers has sparked controversy. In present-day Kazakhstan, as in Ukraine, hunger killed millions of people. Behind the formal explanation of the “correction” lies the delicate balance in relations with Moscow.
New accusations against relatives of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev raise the issue of the cult of personality surrounding local leaders. Azattyk Asia's analysis: “The sudden transformation of the fathers of the nation into figures to be forgotten reflects the very meaning of political loyalty in our region.” The cases of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
The new restrictions introduced by Beijing to control exports of precious minerals essential for sophisticated weapons and artificial intelligence applications raise the issue of deposits in Central Asia. Astana claims to have opened a new mining production line for over 20 million tonnes. But transport and infrastructure shortages make international investment uncertain and risky.
One of the consequences of rapid urbanisation is the proliferation of huge landfills in contexts where only a small percentage of waste is recycled. In Tajikistan alone, over 2 million tonnes of waste accumulate every year, occupying a total of over 300 hectares of land.
At the Dushanbe summit, discussions developed on the route that would directly connect Russia to India and Iran. Moscow is unable to offer Central Asia the large investments that China and Europe can, but it is trying to catch up in terms of transport and logistics infrastructure.
