Accusations against the abbot of Shaolin Temple and Beijing's control over religions
Chinese social media continues to buzz with calls for the removal of the monk, who is accused of scandals. But the temple's accounts remain covered by ‘state secrecy’. The unauthorised meeting with Pope Francis was only the ‘red line’ that was crossed in a clash that had been going on for twenty years over the economic activities of the Shaolin monks. With private vices that emerge only when political support is lost.
Beijing (AsiaNews) - As a Chinese religious leader with broad international influence, Shi Yongxin's personal affairs offer a unique perspective for understanding the status and challenges of religion in contemporary Chinese society.
The scandal surrounding him continues to provoke strong reactions in the country. A few days ago, a lawyer from Jiangsu requested that the Shaolin Temple make its 2023 and 2024 financial statements public, based on the ‘Regulations on the Financial Management of Religious Activity Sites’.
But the response from the local government's Office for Religious Affairs and Ethnic Minorities was that those financial statements are ‘state secrets’.
This statement has raised further doubts about the truth of the case, which broke on the last Sunday in July. Shi Yongxin is accused of embezzling temple assets and having inappropriate relationships with several women.
The Chinese Buddhist Association has officially revoked his monastic documents, expelling him from the religious community. The temple has appointed Master Yinle as the new abbot, following an internal vote.
These drastic measures seem to mark the end of a mystery that had lasted for over six months. On 1 February, Shi Yongxin met Pope Francis without official approval, allegedly violating Chinese diplomatic rules.
Some argue that he thus crossed a “political red line”, leading to his removal from all positions upon his return home. His publications and online content were subsequently removed. However, it is likely that this decision had been planned for some time: it must not have been an emergency reaction.
At the end of January 2025, the Shaolin Temple hosted the first Forum on the Brotherhood of the Future, together with international organisations. Then, in early February, Shi Yongxin attended the sixth edition of the Zayed Award for Human Fraternity in Abu Dhabi, established after the 2019 meeting between the Pope and the Grand Imam of Egypt.
In this context, the meeting with Pope Francis on 1 February seemed natural. From a rational perspective, it should have been welcomed: it represented an opportunity for ‘Chinese religion to go out into the world’ and showcase the country's cultural soft power. However, enthusiasm was met with a wall of political mistrust.
One academic explained that although many thinkers have suggested that establishing diplomatic relations with the Vatican would be beneficial, Chinese leaders remain cautious. They fear that an expansion of religious influence, especially from organised entities such as Catholicism, could undermine the legitimacy of their power.
The so-called “Tocqueville paradox” – according to which prosperity can lead to revolution – is a notion that still resonates among policy makers. As a result, international religious activities are increasingly subject to control and restrictions.
From the case of Master Xuecheng (accused of sexual assault in 2018) to the Shi Yongxin scandal, a series of scandals has tarnished the reputation of Buddhism in China. The Chinese Buddhist Association immediately distanced itself from Shi Yongxin, stating that he had ‘tarnished the image of monks’ and damaged the entire religious environment. But the question remains: if Shi Yongxin violated rules for so long, do religious leaders bear no responsibility? Where is the internal oversight?
Somewhat harshly, the Buddhist Association also criticised Shi's strategy of building the Shaolin brand around kung fu, pointing out that ‘Shaolin is first and foremost Zen, not martial arts’. However, it should be remembered that during the Cultural Revolution, the temple was almost destroyed. When Shi entered as a novice in 1981, there were fewer than ten senior monks. After the boom of the film “Shaolin Temple”, Shi Yongxin promoted the fusion of Zen and kung fu, founded over 200 cultural centres abroad and made the Shaolin Temple famous throughout the world.
There is no denying that Shaolin kung fu, a national intangible cultural heritage, is the basis of his commercial empire, and Shi's role as “CEO in a monk's robe” has been decisive.
From the point of view of religious communication, using martial arts to bring the public closer to Zen thinking was a stroke of genius. In recent months, Shaolin had even entered into dialogue with the Vatican and the UN. Who in Chinese Buddhism can claim to have achieved similar results?
The news of the investigation into Shi Yongxin sparked a real euphoria on social media. Memes and jokes went viral. But the online discussion also raised serious questions: the management of the temple, state-religion relations, justice, transparency and the right to information. The Shaolin Temple Management Office is not a religious body: the monks do not own the land or the buildings, they can only manage religious affairs.
This reflects the state's absolute control over places of worship. Today's allegations are similar to others made in 2015 against Shi Yanlu. At that time, they were dismissed. But if they were well-founded, who covered them up? As in the logic of political purges, private sins only emerge when political support is lost. And the refusal to publish financial statements on grounds of “state secrecy” is seen as a pretext for hiding the truth.
According to the law, temples should make their accounts public. Some also suspect that the Shi case was used to divert attention from worse scandals such as lead poisoning in a nursery school in Tianshui, floods, or the failure to hold the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Congress.
The main issue, however, remains the struggle for control between the temple, with its economic activities, and the local authorities. Back in the 1990s, a company used the name Shaolin for a brand of sausages.
The temple sued and won. It was in 1998 that Shi Yongxin founded a company to register over 600 trademarks related to “Shaolin”. Some say that it was not even him who wanted to commercialise the temple, but that he was “forced” by circumstances.
With 3 million visitors a year and 300 million yuan in ticket sales, the dispute over profits was inevitable. In 2005, it was agreed that 70% of the revenue would go to the government and 30% to the temple. In 2014, the temple sued the authorities for non-payment. In 2009, the authorities wanted to list the site management company on the stock exchange, but Shi strongly opposed this. In the end, he won.
After twenty years, the issues remain unresolved: who really owns the Shaolin Temple? With the fall of Shi Yongxin, accused of crossing the “political red line”, and the ideological purge underway, the temple has been “normalised”. But behind the scenes, the real puppet masters are just waiting for the right moment to move their next pawn.