by Dario Salvi

According to the Jordanian scholar, the Netanyahu government's ultimate goal ‘goes beyond’ defeating Hamas and redrawing borders. The West Bank becomes an ‘opportunity to be exploited’ with a view to annexation. The weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the international community, the new paradigm of the Abraham Accords. Among the nations of the region, ‘more tactics than alliances’.

Milan (AsiaNews) - From Gaza to the West Bank, from Iran to Yemen, Israel today faces ‘seven open fronts’ that are ‘interconnected,’ and what is happening in the Strip is ‘part of a much broader scenario,’ states Amer Al Sabaileh, professor and geopolitical expert on Middle Eastern issues, international security and peace process policy in crisis areas.

Speaking to AsiaNews, the scholar, who contributes to several newspapers including The Jordan Times, analysed recent regional developments including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's announcement to occupy Gaza.

He says that ‘the situation is not simple, due to demographic density and geographical location’. However, over the past two years, the Jewish state has managed to ‘weaken Hamas,’ even if the ultimate goal ‘goes beyond’ defeating the Palestinian movement and redrawing borders. ‘What is happening,’ he emphasises, ‘is part of increasing pressure from Israel to achieve demographic emptying,’ which is one of the primary issues along with the ‘humanitarian crisis caused by the war.’

Israel: annexation objective

Beyond Gaza, ‘the West Bank is certainly one of the fronts’ that are strategic from the perspective of ‘regional security’ for Israel, and this ‘also coincides with the political ambition of some [far-right] parties’ who see ‘an opportunity to be exploited.’

A security need, says Al Sabaileh, that ‘arose after 7 October [2023, with the Hamas attack]’ and leads to considering Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] ‘a threat front’ for the Jewish state, which “justifies” in the eyes of Israelis ‘what they are doing’.

Two years of war have clearly outlined one of the objectives of the Israeli religious and radical right, which aims to ‘annex these territories’ by emptying the West Bank itself "of Palestinian citizens. And this, the Jordanian scholar emphasises, could well happen as a consequence of the policy aimed at guaranteeing the “security” of the state and the “inability of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas to block” Israeli ambitions.

In this context, a different view emerges, and the Abraham Accords take on a different value. Although still important for Israel, they are giving way to “priority issues” for the current leadership, which sees its existence “threatened”. “I believe that the concept of the agreements,” Al Sabaileh emphasises, “is not primary”, especially in relations with the Arab world in the Gulf, “if the United States manages to extend it to countries outside the current context of conflict”.

“These countries outside the area, but Sunni Muslim countries such as Malaysia and/or Azerbaijan, represent an opportunity for Israel to keep the Abraham Accords alive but, at the same time, not to compromise and offer concessions to convince Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, for example”.

International weakness

In the current landscape of heightened conflict and the threat of total occupation of the Strip, “the inability of the international community to intervene or find solutions” is becoming even clearer. The escalation of the war has its origins in the tragedy of 7 October, and this represents a “justification” for political and institutional leaders in Gaza and throughout the Middle East. Even putting pressure on Israel, he adds, ‘could today be a point in favour of Hamas, rather than in support of the Palestinian cause.’

Then there is ‘the American position’ of ‘explicit support’ for the Netanyahu government, which ‘has left little room for manoeuvre’ to find new diplomatic avenues capable of prevailing over the military option or ‘imposing a truce.’

Furthermore, the French solution itself ‘cannot be a plausible solution’ because ‘recognising a country on a theoretical or even political level does not guarantee the end of the conflict,’ he says, not least because it raises the question of ‘who represents it: Hamas, Fatah, which are already divided, or other Palestinian groups.’

‘In the conflict with Hamas,’ he warns, ‘recognition of the Palestinian state cannot offer a resolution to the crisis; on the contrary, it could degenerate’ with even more radical and hostile steps ‘towards the annexation of the West Bank’ in a context that is ‘more thorny and without return’.

Saudi diplomacy itself does not seem to have many cards to play, even if Riyadh still considers itself ‘the heir to the Arab peace initiative’ because ‘it realises the complexity of the situation, especially in terms of security.’

The very issue of eliminating Hamas was an open question for the Arab world and the Gulf monarchies, although ‘no Arab country or force really wanted to face this scenario.’ That is why any political or diplomatic move ‘will have no chance of translating into concrete elements’ capable of influencing Israel's decisions.

‘Considering what has happened,’ Al Sabaileh says, ‘the issue of peace with Saudi Arabia is not as important as it once was, especially if Washington, as mentioned, pushes for “normalisation” with other realities in the Muslim world.’ ‘For this reason,’ he warns, ‘we must realise that the value of peace with the Saudis does not, today, have the strength to exert real pressure or represent a serious incentive for Israel.’

Complex regional picture

From Iran to Lebanon, from Yemen to Syria, not to mention Iraq and Jordan, there are many raw nerves that risk exploding. As far as the conflict with Tehran is concerned, ‘a resumption even in the short term’ is conceivable, because the so-called ‘12-day war’ was fundamental ‘to strike’ the Islamic Republic internally and open up its airspace.

“This has paved the way,” he continues, “for future interventions both at the intelligence level and in ambiguous operations,” as is already happening “every day” inside Iran. “An Israeli return to Iran is expected,” he stresses, “to complete the Iranian scenario, perhaps in a different way” from what we have seen in recent weeks, with the primary objective of “weakening the regime from within”.

‘The style of Israeli intervention may change, but a second confrontation appears imminent and to avoid this scenario [Tehran] has no option but to “occupy” Israel within its own borders.’ In this perspective, the issue of satellite and “proxy” groups from Lebanon to Syria, to the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite groups in Iraq, using “what remains for Iran of what was once the unity of the fronts”, becomes relevant again.

Jordan is another country that is “suffering”, especially now that the issue of “southern Syria” is emerging strongly in relation to “terrorist groups, drug trafficking and arms trade”. The conflict between Druze and Bedouins in Al-Suwayda also “opens up an internal scenario” for Amman, because “the same components are part of Jordanian society, with the risk of exporting” the conflict.

The West Bank itself ‘represents a challenge’ for the Hashemite Kingdom, which ‘will face a moment of truth’ when Israel ‘completes its annexation and begins to push the Palestinian population across the border.’

Another factor of instability is linked to the Syrian government, which ‘could fall,’ a scenario closely watched by Turkey, which must, however, resolve ‘the internal problem represented by the Kurds’ and the growing repression of the opposition.

‘The picture in the Middle East,’ concludes Al Sabaileh, ‘is complex, like the landscape of alliances’ in which there is an alternation between ‘shared interests and conflicts of interest. An individualistic policy is becoming increasingly clear, pushing each country to think of its own interests, creating more tactics than alliances.’

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