Beirut crushed between Hezbollah's megalomania and US short-sightedness
Diplomatic initiatives to rehabilitate the Lebanese state as a credible actor in matters of security, deterrence, and stability seek to correct unrealistic assessments of the possibility that the army alone can dismantle the pro-Iranian movement. Meanwhile, the south of the country is sinking into sad abandonment.
Beirut (AsiaNews) - When President Joseph Aoun recently called on Hezbollah to adopt a “reasonable attitude” and voluntarily hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state, he was addressing a group that has long sacrificed reason in favor of a theocratic utopia. The response of the secretary general of the Party of God, Naïm Kassem, to the head of state, as brutal as it was contemptuous [namely, “you are not broad-shouldered enough for this,” meaning “manliness”], was not a simple verbal outburst.
His words reflect a fundamentalist Islamist view of world history. They transform Lebanon into an “adjustment variable” in a conflict that transcends it and whose outcome, for Iran, heir to the great Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, must be nothing less than the destruction of Israel and the reconquest of Jerusalem.
This ideological position is not new. But what is new today is the growing gap between the pro-Tehran movement's rhetoric of power and the reality of its strategic, military, social, and ideological weakening. In fact, Naïm Kassem's renewed arrogance seems to be based on the highly deceptive assumption of a US “retreat” from the Islamic Republic.
However, everyone knows that if—at least in appearance—Washington's direct pressure on Tehran is easing, in reality this is only a tactical measure and that, therefore, the risk of an Israeli attack targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon automatically increases. The recent increase in air raids by fighter jets bearing the Star of David against targets of the Party of God north of the Litani River is proof of this. After all, for the Jewish state, Hezbollah's disarmament must be total and not limited to the south of the river.
Diplomatic initiatives
It is in this context that the diplomatic initiative announced in Paris, with the implicit support of Saudi Arabia, for an international conference in support of the Lebanese army comes into play. Long postponed, this conference is finally expected to take place in early March in the French capital. This renewed diplomatic momentum is part of an attempt to rehabilitate the Lebanese state as a credible player in security, deterrence, and stability.
This effort was further reinforced by yesterday's announcement of the upcoming visit to Washington by General Rodolphe Haykal, commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army, scheduled for February 3 to 5. This trip aims to correct a serious misjudgment by the US administration that led to the cancellation of a first trip last November.
This initial decision was based on an unrealistic assessment of the capabilities of the Lebanese military. How could the Lebanese army take on all the functions assigned to it alone and at the same time? Being at once: a national defense army; an auxiliary internal security force; an anti-drug brigade; an anti-terrorism police force; a border police force; an intelligence structure tasked with hunting down former officers of Bashar al-Assad's regime who have taken refuge in Lebanon. And, at the same time, deploy 10,000 men in a massive and lasting manner south of the Litani River, without the support of the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is coming to an end?
This accumulation of missions and tasks, even before being a strategic error, seems to be the result of a real denial of reality. The army was asked to replace the “parallel state” without providing it with the financial means, let alone the personnel necessary for the purpose. And it is precisely this element that Hezbollah has exploited, presenting itself as a full partner of the state. An entity equal to the state itself. It almost seems that what really worries the Shiite group is seeing the Lebanese army cease to be a mere “shock absorber of chaos” and return to being a central player in national sovereignty.
The abandoned south
Meanwhile, southern Lebanon is sinking into a sad state of abandonment. The myth of the “parallel state” now clashes with a much more prosaic reality. “Houses destroyed, shops closed, families displaced: there is no money,” journalist Katia Kahil essentially points out. Qard el-Hassan, Hezbollah's financial pillar and social showcase, is in a state of asphyxiation. Compensation checks have been suspended, paperwork is piling up unanswered, and displaced families are surviving on credit, when they are not forced to sell their last remaining property.
In Beirut, Saida, or Nabatiyeh, families live crammed into precarious housing, waiting for support that is now hypothetical. Even services that were once sacrosanct—school aid, university scholarships, medical assistance—have been reduced or frozen.
This is where the real anomaly lies. Hezbollah continues to present itself as a military bulwark against Israel and a social protector, while it is no longer able to fully perform either function. If, as Naïm Kassem says, “no stone will be left standing” if Israel and Washington are allowed to have their way, the fault will lie neither with an external conspiracy nor with the head of state. It will be the result of a double anomaly: a “state within a state” intoxicated by its sacrificial rhetoric and a state forced to exist without the means to do so.
