One year on from the lightning war of May 2025, India and Pakistan continue to celebrate the conflict as a national victory. But behind the patriotic rhetoric, new military vulnerabilities are emerging, along with a growing arms race and unresolved tensions over Kashmir, terrorism and water resources, whilst diplomatic channels between the two nuclear powers remain virtually frozen.

Islamabad/New Delhi (AsiaNews) - A year on from the brief but intense war that in May 2025 brought India and Pakistan back to the brink of open conflict, both countries continue to celebrate that crisis as a national victory.

But behind the patriotic rhetoric, the regional picture remains ambiguous: military capabilities have been strengthened, but so have strategic vulnerabilities, and above all, there is still no real solution in sight to the tensions that led to the clash.

In Pakistan, May this year began with posters and banners dedicated to the military leadership who, according to the government’s official rhetoric, led the country to victory in what has come to be known as “Marka-e-Haq”.

The celebrations held in the capital, Islamabad, in recent days were attended by President Asif Ali Zardari, the Chief of the Armed Forces, Asim Munir – the true architect of Pakistani policy in recent months – the Chief of the Navy, Naveed Ashraf, and the Chief of the Air Force, Zaheer Ahmad Baber Sidhu.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif once again accused India of using the April 2025 Pahalgam attack against dozens of Indian tourists in Kashmir as a “pretext” to launch an “unprovoked” war.

“The enemy, in the dead of night, attacked our mosques and our children,” he declared, claiming that Islamabad had proposed “a transparent investigation” without receiving a response from Delhi. Sharif also stated that “our Shaheens have dominated the conflict” and that “Operation Bunyanum Marsoos is not only a historic victory, but also a triumph of our national honour and self-esteem”.

The celebrations also involved schools, public offices and religious communities. In several institutions, students organised performances, patriotic songs and displays in military uniform.

In India too, the government continues to present the conflict as a strategic success. On 7 May, Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed his profile picture on X to the official logo of Operation Sindoor, the offensive launched by New Delhi against Pakistan in May 2025 in response to the attack in Kashmir. The Prime Minister urged Indians to do the same. “A year ago, our armed forces displayed unparalleled courage, precision and determination,” wrote Modi. “We remain firmly committed to defeating terrorism and destroying the ecosystem that sustains it.”

The conflict had erupted following the attack on 22 April 2025 in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, where gunmen had killed 26 civilians, mostly tourists. India had blamed Pakistan, accusing it of funding terrorist groups in the region, a charge Islamabad rejected.

The war, which lasted just four days and ended on 10 May thanks to a US-brokered ceasefire, was the most serious military escalation between the two countries in recent decades.

Although both capitals insist on proclaiming their own victory, analysts argue that the conflict produced no real winner, leaving the door open for new and increasingly violent escalations.

Pakistan claims success in the aerial clash on the night of 6–7 May 2025, when Chinese J-10C fighters operated by the Pakistani Air Force shot down several Indian aircraft, including French Rafales. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Indian Deputy Chief of Defence, General Anil Chauhan, subsequently admitted to the losses, albeit without providing precise figures.

Islamabad also believes it has gained a diplomatic advantage by publicly accepting US President Donald Trump’s mediation, even going so far as to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Over the past year, Pakistan has strengthened its international profile, largely thanks to the role played by Asim Munir in mediating between Washington and Tehran in the conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran.

India, for its part, claims success with the BrahMos missiles, which struck several Pakistani air bases, including Nur Khan in Rawalpindi and Bholari in Sindh. Delhi also highlights the effectiveness of Israeli drones that penetrated as far as Karachi and Lahore and regards the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, announced on 23 April 2025, the day after the Pahalgam attack, as a strategic achievement.

A year on, both India and Pakistan are seeking to address the vulnerabilities that emerged during the conflict. In Rawalpindi, the Pakistani army has publicly unveiled the new Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC), equipped – according to military leaders – with systems capable of striking “with high precision from any direction”. Islamabad has announced the introduction of the Fatah-III, Fatah-IV and Fatah-V missiles, with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometres.

However, defence expert Muhammad Faisal argues that the conflict also exposed Pakistan’s limitations: “The air force’s initial performance was remarkable,” he explained to Al Jazeera, “but the subsequent BrahMos strikes against air bases revealed gaps in ground defences”.

The Chinese HQ-9B anti-missile system failed to intercept the Indian missiles during the war. Islamabad is now reportedly seeking to acquire the more advanced HQ-19. Meanwhile, Pakistan has increased its defence budget by 20%, reaching 2.55 trillion Pakistani rupees (approximately billion), despite being in the midst of an austerity programme imposed by the International Monetary Fund.

Possible future acquisitions also include up to 40 Chinese fifth-generation J-35A fighter jets, whilst Washington has notified Congress of a 6 million package to modernise Pakistan’s fleet of F-16s.

Analysts believe, however, that the real strategic shift is linked to the end of ‘geographical depth’. Indian missiles have struck targets as far as Rawalpindi, Karachi and Sukkur, demonstrating that geographical obstacles can be overcome.

India, too, however, has had to come to terms with its own vulnerabilities. New Delhi continues to maintain an officially triumphant and highly opaque stance on military losses. C. Uday Bhaskar, a former Indian Navy officer, observed that in a democracy “it would have been more appropriate” for the government to report openly to Parliament on the damage sustained during the conflict. India also believes it has demonstrated its ability to wage a limited war below the nuclear threshold. But it is precisely this conviction that risks increasing the danger of future escalation.

Of all the consequences of the conflict, the potentially most destabilising could be the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, which has regulated the distribution of water resources between the two countries since 1960. The system supplies over 80% of Pakistan’s agriculture and directly sustains the lives of more than 240 million people. Pakistan has water reserves sufficient for around 30 days, compared to India’s 120–220 days.

The main problem, however, concerns the closure of diplomatic channels, without which it is impossible to address the root causes that triggered the war: the partition of Kashmir, cross-border terrorism, military competition and water sharing. Consequently, the risk of a new crisis remains high.

(with contributions from Shafique Khokhar)