Moscow's present and future as seen by Russians abroad

Political scientists, philosophers, analysts and representatives of various associations meet at the annual conference of the Sakharov Centre in Berlin. What emerges is a picture of a society divided between the Z-Patrioty, the ‘turbo-supporters’ of the special operation in Ukraine, and the Uklonisty, the ‘reluctant’ who do not want to openly express their opinions on the war.

Moscow (AsiaNews) - The Sakharov Centre's annual conference on ‘The Country and the World: Russia's Reality in 2025’ was held in Berlin, with the participation of leading political scientists, philosophers, analysts and representatives of various associations of Russians abroad. The reports focused on an analysis of the year that is coming to an end, but above all on prospects for the future, an exchange of views that is in fact impossible in Russia today, summarised by Andrej Kalitin in Novaja Gazeta.

Political scientist Nikolai Petrov, a columnist for The Moscow Times who now lives in Berlin, says that ‘there are two irreconcilable points of view on the issue of repression’, one that believes that the law enforcement agencies are now acting independently with increasing intensity, and another that claims that everything is in the hands of the Kremlin, which moderates the use of force according to its own convenience. There is no doubt that in today's Russia, repression is ‘the main instrument of political administration’, and this applies not only to dissidents, but also to the many arrests for corruption in the defence sector, which seem more like ‘regulatory mechanisms’ of the nomenclature in Russia.

The director of the analytical centre Re: Russia in Vienna, Kirill Rogov, reflects on the dividing line within Russian society, which sees the Z-Patrioty, the “turbo-supporters” of the special operation in Ukraine, on one side, and the Uklonisty, the “reluctant” who do not want to openly express their opinions on the war, adopting a “head-in-the-sand policy”, on the other. For this reason, with the continuation of military action, Putin's regime has also intensified the ideological war within Russian society to strengthen patriotic spirit, elevating the “heroes of the Svo” as a new elite and assigning them leadership roles, even placing them at the top of electoral lists and in regional administrations.

In reality, polls show that the majority of the population has expectations that are very different from Putin's dreams of greatness, wanting peace at last and the ability to communicate freely outside Russia. For Rogov, this is “a great potential for change within the country, already present in society”. This view is shared by the well-known publicist Ekaterina Shulman, who says that “with the war, there were fears of catastrophe even within Russia, while many new opportunities are opening up, even if they are frustrated by the economic stagnation of the last year”, and even the money for the contracts of war volunteers is running out. The bureaucratic elites want to return to peaceful times, but without suffering the consequences of these years of war.

Philologist Aleksandr Baunov also spoke, noting “the great fragility of any negotiations, due to mutual distrust and Moscow's feeling of lack of legitimacy even within the country, which pushes the Kremlin to continuous acts of force”. The new world architecture will still be very unstable, as Ukraine will have to live in a “necessarily reduced world”, and Russia will continue to seek expansion, keeping Ukraine under its sphere of influence. Baunov's crucial question is ‘how will the collective West react? No one knows how to satisfy Russia, not even the equally ravenous Trump...’. According to political philosopher Aleksandr Morozov, there are several options for ending the armed conflict, including those proposed by Trump and Zelenskyj, but there is also a “storiosophical” option that envisages either the total annihilation of Ukraine or, conversely, the disintegration of Russia, even if only on an intellectual level.

The current “Donbassisation” of Russia, as Morozov defines the condition in which the war front is stuck, forces at least 30 million people, in addition to the soldiers at the front, to work in the service of the military sector, from banks to construction companies to Orthodox Church parishes. “Ideology is invading every area of personal and social life”, leaving deep marks on people's biographies and psychology. Intellectuals have largely left Russia, and those who remain shut themselves away in their country dachas, “translating texts from ancient Greek”. The country must be reborn from culture, say the conference participants, because “when the war ends, there will be a need for people who can think, not just shoot”.