Saudi Arabia's new centre of gravity, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea
The war with Iran has triggered a shift in Riyadh that is not merely geographical. Neom, Yanbu, and Jeddah are no longer just scenic elements of Vision 2030, but strategic infrastructures for survival. Hence, Mohammed bin Salman is trying to avoid all-out war with Iran (which would also jeopardise the Red Sea) in a context where the US is no longer a guarantor of stability.
Milan (AsiaNews) – Seductive, glamorous, unscrupulous. Until a year ago, at the time of the Twelve-Day War with Iran (US bombing in June 2025), Mohammed bin Salman was the symbol of a Gulf that sought to enchant the world rather than dominate it.
Photos of the Saudi crown prince (and de facto ruler) aboard mega yachts in the Mediterranean, his lavish vacations in the Maldives, and his secret receptions attended by Western stars, financiers, and businessmen helped build the image of a young leader determined to rid the kingdom of the dust of Wahhabism (one of the most fundamentalist currents of Sunni Islam) and propel it into the age of the global jet set.
Every means to this end became acceptable: Formula 1, golf, European football, concerts, futuristic resorts, funded by seemingly inexhaustible rivers of cash.
Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS as he is colloquially known, essentially sought to become the new Dubai, only bigger, richer, and more powerful: aggressive geopolitically, ambitious economically, and poised to reinvent itself as a global powerhouse in tourism, finance, artificial intelligence, and logistics.
The manifesto of this revolution was, and in many ways still is, Vision 2030, the huge plan through which Riyadh aims to free itself from its dependence on crude oil and become the new economic hub of the Middle East.
Then came the war with Iran, and with it, the brutal return of realpolitik. The Israeli attack against Iran last June, and even more so the joint Israeli-US attack on 28 February, have changed the strategic landscape of the Gulf region.
Even more than the bombs, Riyadh seems to be concerned by the new geography of power emerging: the Strait of Hormuz turned into a geopolitical weapon, the United Arab Emirates increasingly distant from the Saudi line, its exit from OPEC, the Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries. And there is more: the freezing of the Abraham Accords and Donald Trump's return to a Middle East policy based on military pressure and "fluctuating alliances”.
In light of these events, the leader who had built his image on decisive power management and boundless ambition now seems to be rediscovering the old Saudi caution. With the grand desert parties shelved, the imperative once again has become protecting a kingdom suddenly vulnerable, exposed to Iranian attacks, tensions in the Red Sea, rockets and drones from Yemen’s Houthis. Above all, there is the fragility of the Persian Gulf's energy routes.
For the Saudi leadership, the problem is existential since MbS’s entire economic strategy envisioned in Vision 2030 (more tourism, technology, finance, logistics, industry and entertainment, foreign investment, new cities and infrastructure) hinges on a premise that is far from a given today: the security of maritime traffic and the stability of energy exports.
Ultimately, the war has forced upon MBS a truth that the unbridled wealth of oil had almost hidden: Vision 2030 cannot survive without strategic security. This is the focus of Saudi Arabia's current thinking.
According to a recent report by the British think tank Chatham House, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz represents a structural threat to Vision 2030. Approximately a quarter of the world's seaborne oil transits through Hormuz; that is more than 20 million barrels per day in 2025, according to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA).
For Riyadh, the closure represents a blow to the heart of its economy. Over the years, Saudi Arabia had considered a crisis in the Strait possible, but a prolonged closure unlikely. The war with Iran has smashed this belief, hence the need to shift the economic centre of gravity from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.
Thus, in recent months, Riyadh has accelerated projects along the western coast: ports, industrial areas, logistics hubs, futuristic cities, and energy infrastructure. Neom, Yanbu, Jeddah, and the entire Red Sea ridge are now strategic infrastructure for survival, not just scenic elements of Vision 2030.
Saudi Aramco, the Saudi state oil company, is studying ways to boost crude oil transport capacity from east to west through inland pipelines.
Currently, the Saudi system can move approximately four million barrels per day to the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea, but the goal is to reach at least seven million to offset any future blockages in Hormuz.
MbS's reasoning is simple: whoever controls the new energy and trade routes will control the future of the Gulf. This is where competition with UAE emerges in full swing.
In recent years, the latter has built a network of ports and strategic bases between the Horn of Africa, Yemen, Eritrea, and the Red Sea. Dubai and Abu Dhabi aim to consolidate their position as global logistics platforms capable of surviving even the Persian Gulf crisis.
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not new, but it is now particularly striking. The UAE's decision to withdraw from OPEC, announced on 1 May 2026, represents a direct challenge to Saudi energy leadership.
Abu Dhabi has also politically, financially, and militarily supported militant groups in southern Yemen who seek to restore a separate state as it existed before unification in 1990. This strategy (aimed at controlling ports on the Indian Ocean) clashes with Riyadh’s, which supports an internationally recognised united Yemen.
Regarding the recent conflict between Israel, the US, and Iran, the UAE has taken a stance much closer to Israel and the United States. Riyadh, on the other hand, has chosen a cautious approach, fearing that direct involvement would expose the kingdom to Iranian retaliation and, above all, attacks by Yemen’s Houthis.
The Saudis know that a full escalation with Iran would immediately transform the Red Sea into a permanent war front.
In this context, the Abraham Accords are essentially dead in the water. The prospect of normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which until 2024 appeared to be a major US diplomatic goal, is now on hold. Not only because of the war in Gaza, but because Riyadh now considers Israel a destabilising factor for the entire region. Even US President Donald Trump appears to have lost some of Saudi Arabia's trust.
The US leader had envisioned a large armada to protect Hormuz, but Riyadh (according to authoritative press sources) has refused to grant the use of its bases and airspace for a large-scale US operation.
Lately, Mohammed bin Salman is working hard to reach an agreement with Iran that will prevent a resumption of attacks, something that Trump himself has acknowledged.
Behind these Saudi initiatives is a growing conviction: Washington is no longer capable of ensuring regional stability as it has in the past, and relying completely on the United States could become a risk.
In short, one fact seems clear: Paradoxically the US’s staunch Saudi ally and MbS's Vision 2030 project are among the most affected by the Trump-Netanyahu war against Iran.
International investors are eyeing the Persian Gulf more cautiously and with greater detachment. Insurance costs for maritime traffic have risen. At home, the major speculative and symbolic operations launched by the Saudi prince are undergoing a review, although it would be a mistake to simply interpret this new course as a retreat.
For Riyadh, the time has come for strategic consolidation; less ostentation and more substance, less media-driven soft power, more energy and logistics security.
Paradoxically, in the long run, the Hormuz crisis might even prove beneficial to Saudi Arabia. The kingdom enjoys a unique geographic advantage among Gulf countries: two maritime outlets, to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. No other country can boast this strategic position.
If Riyadh manages to transform the Red Sea into a stable trade corridor, shifting the axis of trade, it could emerge as the main logistics hub of the post-Hormuz Middle East.
Naturally, this comes with a hefty price: new infrastructure, oil pipelines, naval security, agreements with Egypt, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. But the war has convinced the Saudis that there is likely no alternative.
There's certainly no shortage of money in the kingdom’s coffers. It remains to be seen though what strategies will be employed to achieve the stated goals, in a battle where the main fact at stake is hegemony over the Gulf for decades to come.
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04/09/2008
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