The trials of pro-Russian clergy in Ukraine

Already 38 clerics linked to the Moscow Patriarchate have been found ‘guilty’ of treason by the courts in Kiev. Many are asking to be transferred to Russia, but there are no signs of a particularly favourable welcome there: in the ‘hybrid war’ of Ukrainian politics, the presence of ‘loyal’ metropolitans, bishops and priests in the country is a factor that cannot be ignored.

Kiev (AsiaNews) - Following the final decision on 18 August to dissolve the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as it is linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, the security services have begun proceedings to bring 180 members of the clergy, including 23 bishops, to court, with investigations largely beginning immediately after Russia's invasion in 2022.

The charges are illegal actions in aid of the Russian armed forces and services, as highlighted in an article in Ukrainska Pravda entitled ‘The devil under the sacred robes’, considered high treason to justify Moscow's aggression, including the corruption of minors and the illegal sending of Ukrainian citizens to Russia across the border.

To date, Ukrainian courts have already found 38 UPZ clergy guilty. The Metropolitan of Kiev of the pro-Russian Church, Onufryj (Berezovskij), has refused to comply with the separation from Moscow imposed by state bodies, believing that this does not concern his Church, which acts independently in its ecclesiastical functions, and that the link with Moscow remains only a historical memory that cannot be erased. This position prompted the Kiev Ethnic Policy Committee to request the cancellation of the state registration of the UOC Metropolis.

Meanwhile, priests or ordinary members of the UPZ Church structures who are facing legal proceedings or are under particular scrutiny by the security services are increasingly asking to be transferred to Russia, where, however, there are no signs of a particularly favourable welcome.

The Ukrainian coordination committee for prisoner exchanges, as reported by Religijna Pravda, also confirms that ‘there is no practice of exchanging military or civilian prisoners for UOC Orthodox priests’.

Informally, however, some anonymous Ukrainian law enforcement officials say that “for one Upz priest, they give us at least ten prisoners, and sometimes, in addition to ordinary soldiers or civilians, we manage to get back some high-ranking agents of the Ukrainian special services”.

As is well known, Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed), former superior of the Kiev Caves Monastery, also known as Paša Mercedes because of his passion for luxury cars, has been asked several times if he would like to be included in the exchange lists with Russia, but from his current house arrest he has always replied no, because ‘I love Ukraine’.

Pavel's position, like that of Metropolitan Onufryj, is supported by promises from Russia, both in terms of a military victory and the future configuration of Ukraine after the war, with possible presidential elections in which the Russians hope to exert influence to obtain a scenario much more favourable to Moscow.

In this “hybrid war” of Ukrainian politics, the role of the Church seems to be decisive, and for the Russians, the permanence of the UOC metropolitans, bishops and priests in the country, despite all the risks it entails for their freedom and social life, is a factor that cannot be renounced.

• Ukraine
• Russia
• Orthodox Church
• Patriarchate Moscow