Syria's Assad regime was considered the narco-state par excellence, but its fall has led to a spread of production on a regional scale. Constant demand and growing distribution fuel trafficking. Among the new production centres is Yemen, home to the Houthi rebels. Today, the heart of production takes place in small laboratories scattered throughout various countries.

Beirut (AsiaNews) - For over a decade, Bashar al-Assad's regime, with the collaboration of gangs and traffickers across the border in Lebanon, has been the primary hub for the production and trafficking of Captagon, exploited to the full by rebel groups, to the extent that Syria has become the narco-state of the Middle East.

The substance has proved to be a primary source of income, as well as a tool for exerting political and diplomatic pressure.

However, in the last four years, Captagon has crossed the borders of the Arab country and spread to several countries in the Middle East, including Yemen, and Africa, especially Sudan, encouraged by constant demand, growing distribution and ease of production.

In recent days, Syrian media have reported the seizure by anti-drug squads of approximately 11 million pills from neighbouring Lebanon. The previous week, Syrian and Iraqi forces carried out a joint operation, resulting in the interception of hundreds of kilograms of narcotics.

The goods, explains the Sana agency, were contained “in a vehicle coming from Lebanese territory” stopped “in the southern countryside of Homs”.

A note from the anti-drug directorate recalls the “continuous efforts to prosecute drug traffickers and producers” and to “limit criminal activities associated with drug trafficking and its negative effects on the security and protection of society”.

The scale of trafficking and the increasingly diverse production sites are detailed in the report Special Project on the Captagon Trade, compiled by experts from the New Lines Institute.

This in-depth study documents over 1,800 cases of seizures and discoveries over the last 10 years. The database uses open source tools to document operations related to smuggling, production, storage and arrests.

The increase in seizures of laboratories outside Syria and Lebanon between 2021 and the fall of Assad at the end of 2024 did not correspond to an increase in overall supply.

On the contrary, despite the record number of raids and arrests recorded last year, the average size of each shipment decreased, leading to a decline in the total amount seized, particularly in major consumption centres such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

This suggests a shift to small-scale production operations. The Assad regime provided state support, security cover and access to raw materials that facilitated industrial production, the reality of which emerged after the fall.

In the first four months of 2025, the new Syrian interim government seized over 200 million pills from production facilities and warehouses, including military installations, which is 20 times the amount seized by Assad's forces throughout 2024.

In contrast, emerging suppliers in other countries often lack such political support and established networks.

This absence makes it difficult for new producers to obtain the necessary raw materials and proceed with preparation without attracting the attention of law enforcement agencies, adopting a strategy characterised by more frequent and smaller shipments to evade controls.

However, the risk of it spreading to other fragile countries such as Yemen and Sudan is now higher than ever.

In Egypt, domestic Captagon production facilities have emerged since 2021, coinciding with significant law enforcement efforts to combat them through arrests. In addition to specific operations related to raids on laboratories, the authorities in Cairo have made numerous other Captagon-related arrests, indicating an increase in crime. For example, a Syrian smuggler was arrested in Giza in possession of one million pills, and two women were arrested at the capital's international airport while attempting to smuggle two kilograms of pills.

Over the past four years, production centres have emerged in northern and southern Iraq, which has transformed itself from a transit country into a producer nation, as evidenced by a series of recent seizures of laboratories in the Kurdistan region. Although numerous shipments of Captagon from Syria have been intercepted as they entered Iraq, there has been no evidence of Syrian citizens' involvement in the production facilities or local production networks dismantled by the Baghdad authorities. Last year, a new National Drug Control Centre was inaugurated in the capital with the aim of improving cooperation and information exchange, although it is unclear how it will function and how it will affect cooperation on a regional scale.

Since 2021, Kuwait is no longer just a transit point, but has also become a production centre, according to a development confirmed by the discovery – and dismantling – last year of a sophisticated drug production laboratory in a remote desert area in the north. Also last year, a trafficker was arrested in possession of a significant quantity of pills, raw materials and a press used for drug production.

2021 was also a turning point for Turkey, which has been losing its traditional role as a transit nation and moving towards domestic production, fuelling illicit trafficking that has led to an increase in crime, as evidenced by numerous arrests. The authorities in Ankara have conducted large-scale operations in various cities, leading to the arrest of numerous suspects and the seizure of large quantities of pills, often accompanied by weapons. With regard specifically to Syrian involvement, a seizure in Istanbul in 2022 led to the arrest of three people, including two Syrian nationals and one Lebanese national, demonstrating the role of cross-border criminal organisations.

Finally, there is Yemen, where there has been an increase in Captagon-related activities over the last two years. According to our database, 400,000 pills were seized within or originating from the country in 2024, a figure that rose to 5.4 million in the first nine months of 2025.

Saudi Arabia, the closest and most lucrative market, was the hardest hit, with four seizures in 2025 compared to only one in 2024. Early indications suggest that Houthi rebels may be involved in this trade, although the extent is not entirely clear. As competition intensifies, especially in fragile security environments, the trade is likely to become more violent, with rival groups vying for control of routes and markets.

This is what happened on the Syrian-Lebanese border after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 and early 2025, when criminal organisations involved in Captagon trafficking sought to flee and dispose of their remaining stocks, causing a sharp and violent increase in smuggling and turf wars along the border.

Finally, the limited availability of the drug due to increased repression and controls could lead to a shift to methamphetamine production, increasing the risks of addiction. Overburdened health systems, particularly in Iraq, are not equipped to deal with growing addiction to stimulants.

Small mobile laboratories are more difficult to detect, and traffickers are adopting new methods to avoid detection, putting a strain on law enforcement agencies that are already short of resources. This is why, in countries that do not have robust drug control infrastructures, coordinating effective responses remains a major challenge.