by Gregory

The second phase of the general elections promoted by Myanmar's military junta took place on 11 January. Voting also reached disputed areas and conflict zones, where the military threatened civilians and made accusations of coercion. According to the United Nations and independent observers, the process lacks democratic credibility and represents an attempt to gain international legitimacy for a regime that continues to rule by force.

Yangon (AsiaNews) - Myanmar's military junta has also conducted the second phase of controversial general elections, while civil conflict continues to rage in the country. On Sunday 11 January, voting took place in over 100 municipalities, including disputed areas where armed ethnic groups maintain significant control over the territory.

The military junta launched the first national electoral process since the military coup in February 2021, in which the army overthrew the government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The junta, which changed its name first to the State Administration Council (SAC) and now to the State Peace and Security Commission (SSPC), is seeking international legitimacy, but several human rights organisations consider the elections a sham lacking democratic credibility. The UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has called the process a form of “institutionalised coercion”.

For many Myanmar citizens, the elections are seen as a matter of survival under a regime that also uses the ballot box as a tool of control. ‘The results only exist in the mouths of the military,’ said a Yangon resident who wished to remain anonymous. ‘These elections have nothing to do with ending our suffering. On the contrary, the military is keeping the weight of its boots on our necks.’

Unlike the first phase on 28 December, which was limited to areas under the army's tightest control, the second round of elections extended to regions marked by conflict. Explosions and artillery fire were reported in several locations near polling stations, while the Burmese armed forces intensified military operations in the weeks leading up to the vote.

According to some independent observers, the army sought to temporarily secure certain areas for the time necessary to set up polling stations, often accompanying election officials to towns that had been almost completely abandoned by the civilian population fleeing the fighting.

The situation appeared particularly serious in Shan State, Kayin State and some areas of Sagaing and Magway regions. In Hpapun, described by witnesses as a “ghost town”, voting took place exclusively within military posts.

In large cities such as Yangon and Mandalay, coercion took less visible but equally pervasive forms. Local administrators warned families that failure to provide proof of voting (represented by an ink-stained finger) could result in the loss of documents needed to access public services, enrol children in school or obtain medical care.

Several accounts also indicate that at some polling stations, younger voters were warned that participating in the vote could affect their position on the lists for compulsory military conscription.

In camps for internally displaced persons in Shan and Kachin States, other witnesses reported receiving threats that humanitarian aid and travel permits would be suspended if they refused to vote for the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

Most of the popular political leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, are still in prison, while the USDP (which in the first phase on 28 December claimed to have won over 90% of the seats) faced minimal competition.

Some symbolic opposition figures did participate, such as Lwin Myint of the People's Party, a former political prisoner and leader of the 1988 student protests, but without access to state media and with severe restrictions on campaigning.

In numerous constituencies in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions, USDP candidates ran unopposed, eliminating even the appearance of electoral competition.

According to Ben Lee, executive director of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, this second phase also confirms the lack of credibility of the elections.

The first round, he noted, was marked by widespread boycotts and much lower turnout than that declared by the junta. In his view, the same dynamics will be repeated in the subsequent phases. Lee pointed out that the main political parties, including the NLD, remain banned, while, according to some estimates, the army controls less than 40% of the national territory.

Furthermore, millions of people in at least 65 municipalities will not be able to vote at all. At the international level, he called for stronger sanctions and an arms embargo (the junta currently purchases most of its arms from China and Russia), while ASEAN should reject the election results and continue to exclude the junta from regional forums.

Local sources indicate that in many areas, turnout in the second phase did not exceed 35%, well below the 52% claimed by the regime for the first phase in December.

The third and final phase of the process is scheduled for 25 January. Despite the appointment of Nyo Saw as prime minister under the new SSPC structure, real power remains concentrated in the hands of General Min Aung Hlaing, the general who has been in command of the country since the coup.