Chinese targets attacked in Kabul as Beijing strengthens economic presence
Seven people were killed in an attack claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the commercial district of Shahr-e-Naw. The attack, which is part of a broader anti-Chinese jihadist campaign, reignites fears for the security of investments in Afghanistan. Beijing continues to maintain a diplomatic and economic presence, while internal divisions within the Taliban leadership complicate the political and security situation.
Kabul (AsiaNews/Agencies) - Beijing confirmed this morning that an attack yesterday in Kabul killed one Chinese citizen and wounded five others. Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun reiterated at a press conference that travel to Afghanistan should be avoided and asked people to leave ‘high-risk areas as soon as possible’.
The attack took place in Shahr-e-Naw, a commercial district of the Afghan capital. The non-governmental organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) said it had received 20 wounded in its clinic. According to the Taliban authorities, the final toll is seven dead and 13 wounded.
The attack was claimed by the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (known by the acronym ISKP), which targeted a Chinese noodle restaurant run by a Muslim couple from Xinjiang. Before the terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack, the Taliban authorities had tried to spread the news that it was an accident caused by a gas cylinder explosion.
Since regaining control of the country in August 2021, the Taliban have sought to downplay the threat posed by the Islamic State, which considers the Taliban's ideology too lukewarm and has therefore continued to target both the Taliban and foreigners doing business in Afghanistan.
Yesterday's suicide bombing is the third in the last five years that ISKP has claimed against Chinese citizens. In November 2022, the terrorist group attacked a hotel in the same area of Kabul, while in January a year ago it killed a Chinese worker in the Afghan province of Takhar.
ISKP has been producing propaganda material against China for some time. Analyst Lucas Webber explained that the attack shows “how Afghanistan has become a front line in the jihadist campaign against Beijing”.
It was therefore an operation that “seems calibrated not only to cause casualties, but also to send a political message: China's growing presence in Afghanistan and its partnership with the Taliban authorities will come at a cost in terms of security”.
In Islamic State propaganda, Xinjiang, also known as East Turkestan, a region inhabited by the Uighur minority, mostly of Islamic faith, has taken on greater prominence since 2021. China has consequently become one of the organisation's main enemies.
After the Taliban recaptured power, Beijing (along with Moscow) maintained its embassy in Afghanistan, unlike the rest of the international community, which withdrew its diplomatic delegations and avoided formally recognising the new government in Kabul.
Since then, China – albeit with some caution, according to several observers – has continued to invest in Afghanistan, especially in the extraction of gold and other minerals, such as lithium, copper and iron.
Chinese exports more than doubled between 2021 and 2024, while imports declined, causing a trade deficit that led the Taliban to set up a special commission in March 2025 to address the situation. Several other projects, such as the Mes Aynak copper mine, are not yet active or fully operational, but despite delays of several years, they have not been abandoned by Beijing.
The situation is further complicated by internal divisions within the Taliban leadership. The supreme leader of the Islamic Emirate, Hibatullah Akhundzada, proposes a vision of a country isolated from the modern world, where religious figures control every aspect of society, while a group of Taliban close to the Haqqani network would like to see an Afghanistan that engages with the outside world, strengthens the country's economy and even allows girls access to education, one of the many rights denied to them after 2021.
These internal tensions add to the low-intensity war with the Islamic State of Khorasan, but they do not prevent China from continuing, albeit very slowly, with its rare earth extraction projects.
In August last year, Beijing explicitly expressed its desire for Afghanistan to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the mega infrastructure project launched by Xi Jinping in 2013. At the time, Beijing declared that it would continue to support the Taliban government in achieving long-term peace and stability.
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24/09/2021 15:51
