Delhi creates five districts in Ladakh to segregate Buddhists and Muslims

Following decades of rivalry between the political leaderships of the towns of Leh and Kargil, the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in 2019 had fostered a historic alliance calling for greater constitutional safeguards and the protection of tribal lands. Now, the establishment of new administrative units in the Himalayan region has reignited accusations against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government of seeking to divide the population along ethnic and religious lines and to facilitate direct control from Delhi.

Leh (AsiaNews) - The Indian government’s decision to create five new administrative districts in the Himalayan plateau of Ladakh has reignited fears of a “divide and rule” strategy by Delhi, similar to what has already occurred in Kashmir.

The territorial reorganisation, approved on 27 April by Governor Vinai Kumar Saxena, has highlighted attempts by the central government to divide the region’s Buddhists and Muslims, who had managed to overcome years of rivalry and mutual mistrust by building a common political platform against the growing direct control of the executive led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

With the creation of the new districts of Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar and Drass, the Himalayan territory has expanded from two to seven administrative districts. Officially, the aim is to decentralise power and improve access to public services in the most isolated areas. But some analysts argue that the real aim is to reduce the political influence of the Muslim community and break up the coalition that the cities of Leh and Kargil – long the region’s two main religious and political centres – had managed to build in recent years.

According to the latest available census, dating from 2011, Ladakh has a population of around 274,000, of whom 46.4% are Muslim and 39.6% are Buddhist. Although Muslims represent a slight demographic majority, under the new administrative boundaries they will be in the majority in only two districts (Kargil and Drass). Historian Siddiq Wahid has pointed out that this “reduces Muslim representation to less than a third, despite Muslims and Buddhists having almost equal numbers”.

What is currently unfolding in Ladakh is the next phase of a political transformation that began in 2019, when the Modi government revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir by abolishing Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and dividing the former state into two union territories administered directly by Delhi: Jammu and Kashmir on one side, Ladakh on the other.

Many Buddhists in Leh initially saw this decision as a historic victory. For decades they had been calling for separation from Kashmir, claiming they had been marginalised both economically and politically. As early as the 1950s, Buddhist leaders had been calling for greater autonomy, and in some cases direct annexation to the central Indian government. In the 1980s, the Ladakh Buddhist Association transformed this demand into a genuine identity-based mobilisation, paving the way for sectarian tensions with the Muslim population of Kargil.

In 1989, the situation crystallised: in Leh, the view spread that Muslims and Kashmir represented an obstacle to the region’s development, whilst the predominantly Shia town of Kargil reacted by aligning itself with Kashmir and opposing separation, fearing it would become yet another marginalised outpost.

After thirty years of divisions along religious lines, the arrangement imposed in 2019 led to an alliance between the two rival cities. The joy of Leh’s inhabitants at having secured recognition as a Union Territory (like New Delhi, Puducherry and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) was soon replaced by disillusionment. Ladakh has, in fact, not yet obtained an elected local parliament, unlike Jammu and Kashmir, but has come under the direct control of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs through what is known as a lieutenant governor, appointed by Delhi.

Officials from other parts of India have taken control of key administrative decisions, whilst the two elected autonomous councils of Leh and Kargil have lost political clout. Many residents have expressed fears that opening up to external investment could encourage the arrival of workers and businesses, threatening the demographic balance and putting tribal lands at risk.

It is thanks to these shared fears that Leh and Kargil have drawn closer together. The two main local political organisations – the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance – have thus decided to join forces, demanding four fundamental guarantees: full recognition under the Constitution, protection of local lands and jobs, broader political representation, and the restoration of democratically elected institutions.

The convergence between Buddhists and Muslims represents, according to several commentators, an unprecedented turning point in Ladakh’s political history. Figures such as climate activist Sonam Wangchuk have also contributed to the general mobilisation, organising protests, fasts and marches to denounce the growing centralisation of power by Delhi.

In 2021, the Indian government was forced to set up a ‘High-Powered Committee’ to negotiate a solution with Ladakh’s representatives. This solution never materialised because, in September last year, talks broke down following violent protests in Leh. Negotiations have resumed in recent months and, according to various Indian media outlets, a preliminary agreement has reportedly been reached to create an elected legislative body with administrative and financial powers, as well as specific constitutional safeguards similar to those guaranteed in other Himalayan states.

Many residents view the Indian government’s new promises with suspicion. The creation of the new districts appears to be an attempt to weaken the solidarity that has developed between Buddhists and Muslims. “It is yet another example of the project to marginalise Muslims being pursued by the Modi government across India,” said Sajjad Kargili, a leading figure in local activism.

Since coming to power in 2014, the BJP has sought to bolster its support by polarising the electorate along ethnic and religious lines. This has also happened, for example, in Manipur, where the conflict that erupted three years ago has still not been resolved by the government, which initiated negotiations but has since shown a certain lack of interest.

“The question Ladakhis are asking themselves today,” historian Siddiq Wahid emphasised, “is whether the talks are truly an attempt at peace or merely a strategy to buy time whilst the political landscape of Ladakh is slowly being redrawn to Delhi’s advantage.”

INDIAN MANDALA IS THE ASIANEWS NEWSLETTER DEDICATED TO INDIA. WOULD YOU LIKE TO RECEIVE IT EVERY FRIDAY? TO SUBSCRIBE, CLICK HERE.

• Indian
• Mandala