The fight against Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus
From Kabardino-Balkaria to Chechnya, new attacks by individuals or Islamist groups have been reported in recent months. But there is also controversy over the methods of repression, with the use of torture and the data itself, which some believe has been exaggerated to replicate the sense of insecurity that led to Putin's rise. Meanwhile, it is precisely war and economic instability that fuel radicalism.
Moscow (AsiaNews) - During 2025, there have been several incidents of armed assaults on law enforcement agencies by groups and members of radical Islamic movements in the Russian republics of the North Caucasus, such as in July in Kabardino-Balkaria, where similar incidents had not occurred for over six years.
The head of the republic, whose capital is Nal'chik, Kazbek Kokov, urged that no mercy be shown to terrorists, and his call was immediately heeded by his Chechen colleague Ramzan Kadyrov, who had a 17-year-old resident of Achkhoj-Martan accused of attacking police officers killed on the spot. His body was displayed for public ridicule, and several families considered accomplices to the attacks were subsequently expelled from the republic.
The methods used to combat the radicalisation of young people are the subject of much debate, due to the way cases are brought, the use of torture and the falsification of statistics. There have been other cases of accusations against minors, two 15-year-olds in North Ossetia and a 16-year-old in the city of Bujnaksk in Dagestan, who have been accused of “terrorist attacks” against members of the security forces.
Activist Aleksandr Cherkasov of the Memorial Centre believes that in reality there is no underground “youth cell”, but rather a “constantly evolving movement”, of which young people are one of many components, exposed by the authorities to accentuate repressive actions.
In fact, there is no coordinated plan by radical Islamic groups such as ISIS or others to destabilise the North Caucasus, even if new cells arise sporadically with sensational actions, such as the attack on an Orthodox church in Dagestan two years ago.
The excessive repression by the authorities of the various republics is intended to replicate the sense of insecurity and the need for strong measures, which was one of the original motivations for Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 1998, when he was appointed prime minister to ‘go and get all the terrorists, wherever they are’.
For this reason, official statistics report annual figures of between 800 and 1,200 terrorists “destroyed, neutralised or captured”, according to various formulas, including among them “field commanders”, “fighters” or simply “accomplices”.
This artificial “growth of radicalism” is also influenced by the war in Ukraine, which is supported with particular fervour by the leaders of Russia's Caucasian republics and is associated with the universal conflict between Russians and Westerners and between Caucasians and Islamic extremists.
Digital chat data is therefore “fabricated” and “provocative actions” are exaggerated in order to be able to act more intensively in repressive operations, including against “nationalists”, ethnic separatists and “traitors” who support Ukraine. If statistics show a lower number of these categories, Moscow would reduce its financial support and military and police personnel.
On the other hand, as Cherkasov points out, it is precisely the excesses of persecution that fuel radical tendencies, especially among the very young. The steadily declining standard of living, especially in this region, with its high unemployment rate, is also making the situation of the younger generation increasingly unstable, as they do not want war and military service to be their only prospects in life.
As several recent events have shown, this does not only concern the most marginalised sections of the population, but also many members of the so-called “golden youth”, the children of municipal leaders or other officials, making Islamic radicalism a form of dissent against the regime in Russia and the Caucasus, which offers no real hope for the future.
In the Muslim regions of Russia, Salafi Islam offers answers that are often interpreted not as support for patriotic rhetoric, but as an indication of alternative social, economic and political paths. Caucasian Islamic radicalism is growing in parallel with far-right neo-Nazism in Russia, outlining a new possible internal conflict within the Federation.
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